This article contributes to debates that aim to go beyond the 'democratisation' and 'post-democratisation' paradigms to understand change and continuity in Arab politics. In tune with calls to focus on the actualities of political dynamics, the article shows that the literatures on State Formation and Contentious Politics provide useful theoretical tools to understand change/continuity in Arab politics. It does so by examining the impact of the latest Arab Uprisings on state formation trajectories in Iraq and Syria. The Uprisings have aggravated a process of regime erosionwhich originated in post-colonial state-building attempts-by mobilising sectarian and ethnic identities and exposing the counties to geo-political rivalries and intervention, giving rise to trans-border movements, such as ISIS. The resulting state fragmentation has obstructed democratic transition in Syria and constrained its consolidation in Iraq.
beyond the 'democratization' and 'post-democratization' frameworks. Following on calls to refocus scholarly attention on the actualities of political dynamics, in the first section, I argue that an examination of state formation and the contentious politics that punctuate this process provide useful avenues to understand political change and continuity in the Arab world. Bringing in the state formation literature provides historical depth to current political upheavals in the Middle East, such as the Arab uprisings. In focusing on trajectories of state formation in varying contexts, we examine how state-building attempts engender anti-regime political mobilisation, creating contentious politics. Contentious politics activate latent identities, mobilise passive populations, and give rise to new ideologies and actors, creating opportunities for political change, of which democratisation is only one possibility. Whilst I argue that an understanding of the socio-political conditions that could facilitate or obstruct democratisation is socially important, we should not allow this to determine or distort our analysis of politics in the region.
In the second section I present an empirical analysis on the impact of the Arab uprisings on Iraqi and Syrian state formation. First, I analyse how the post-colonial state-building processes in Iraq and Syria contributed to regime erosion. This will set the historical context to then examine the impact of the current uprisings on each of the two cases. I conclude the study by assessing the conditions that could facilitate or hinder democratisation in Iraq and Syria.
Political change, continuity and development in the Arab world

Before and beyond democratization and authoritarian resilience
Attempts to understand political change and continuity in the Middle East have centred on two intersecting questions: First, how do we explain the absence of democracy in the Arab world? Second, how do we explain regime resilience in the region? Whilst the answer to the latter question should provide insights to the former, the two waves of literatures that contributed frameworks to answers these questions remained analytically divorced. The first, which emerged in the 1990s, focused on Arab states' resistance to the 'third wave' democratisations, continuing a legacy initiated by modernisation theories of the 1950s and 1960s. 1 The absences of a civil society, a strong bourgeoisie, democratic political culture or democratic interlocutors were all advanced as explanations for the absence of democracy in the region 2 . However, disenchanted by the faltering hope of political change in the region scholars moved to a 'postdemocratisation' paradigm that examined 'how political rule in the Arab countries is effectuated, organized, and executed' to generate stability and regime survival. 3 Then came the Arab uprisings in 2010/11. Two ostensibly entrenched authoritarian leaders (Bin Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt) were toppled in a matter of few weeks, triggering a wave of uprisings in other Arab countries. Academic responses to the uprisings reflected the two dominating paradigms. Some regional experts argued that a focus on the 'myth of authoritarian stability' had missed the underlying factors that caused the winds of change. 4 However, with the return of the military to power in Egyptian politics, emergence of civil wars in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen, constrained transition in Tunisia, and regime survival in Morocco, Jordan and the Gulf, others observed continuities in Arab politics 5 .
Nevertheless, despite the greater pace, intensity, and innovations in political Hence, it should not come as a surprise that scholarly responses to the uprisings have fluctuated between explanations of change and continuity. However, the analytical link between political change and continuity in Arab politics remains to be established.
One reason for the absence of such an analytical link is the democracy factor. This factor has framed and in some cases determined how we think about political change in the Arab world. In searching for the "absence of democracy", scholarly attention has been diverted away from developing methods, concepts and theories to understand how politics actually works. 6 The call for a 'post-democratisation' paradigm may have contributed to bring politics back in to the analysis; however, its focus on regime resilience comes at the expense of missing interesting forms of resistance against domination, and hence an understandings of potential originators of change 7 . An examination of the 'genealogy of resistance' 8 , for example the politicisation, rise, and development of Shi'a political Islam in opposition to Baathist domination in Iraq, could be very useful to understand and explain strategies of regime adaptation, state reformation or political change in contemporary Iraq.
Moving beyond the democratisation and post-democratisation requires the settling of two issues. First, there is a need to move one step back to analyse politics as a domain of domination and resistance that, especially in the Arab world, takes place in processes of state making and unmaking in varying political contexts. 9 Second, it is important to free political analysis from normative frames, while recognizing that normative concerns continue to shape societies' interests in the political world. Political analysis cannot be indifferent to many Arabs' resistance to the violence, injustice, and corruption of authoritarianism, 11 and understanding its causes and the conditions for democratic transition are socially important-not only for a Western audience of American political science, donors or policymakers 12 . But answers to this normative goal would first require an understanding of the political world.
Bringing politics back in: State formation and Contentious Politics
In this section, I will argue that a focus on state formation/deformation processes and the contentious politics they generate offers two main advantages in understanding political change in the Arab world. First, it contributes to the identification of the underlying struggles that gives politics its shape and direction: despite the varying paths to state formation, the direction of the process is universally similar: a drive to centralise (especially coercive) power as a pre-requisite to institutionalise order and to facilitate socio-economic development. Second, this drive almost always generates resistance by dissatisfied challengers, spawning contentious politics. I start by sketching the state formation process. 13 By monopolising coercion (control over the tools of violence such as the police, security, army, courts) an actor prevents its rivals from similar tools of violence that would otherwise threaten it. Starting in the 1950s in republics such as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen or Libya, we observe a varying but steady process of increasing domination by the army over political life, usually at the expense of other social and political forces. 14 Successful domination over the coercive, economic, and ideological spheres gave rise to political regimes 16 of varying types. But these were far from consolidated 'states', understood here as institutions (set of norms, rules and practices) that regulate but stand above political struggles and actors. In early state formation, a regime is one dominant group ruling over others in a particular jurisdiction. As Max Weber argues:
'Like the political institutions historically preceding it the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence.' 17 While a certain co-optation of social forces in rentier monarchies and populist republics was necessary for regime survival, 18 this was far from being fully politically inclusive--as facilitated by competitive elections allowing participation by all social forces. The limits of inclusion made the Arab state vulnerable, not only to political shocks (such as the Arab uprisings) but also to external infiltration. 19 The drive for regime survival engenders resistance against such attempted domination. Resistance forces seek to de-monopolise a regime's grip over the above-mentioned three spheres; by offering competing ideologies, economic strategies, and, in certain cases, armed resistance, oppositional forces create the basis for alternative regimes.
Whilst state formation provides a generic framework that highlights a regime's drive for domination and an opposition's resistance, this struggle is punctuated by periods of what students of social movements call Contentious Politics (CP):
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of a least one of the claimants. 20 The CP research agenda raises key questions and provides interesting conceptual tools Departing from state formation and CP, the latest Arab uprisings appear an episode of collective interaction that pitted previously passive populations against regimes under varying socio-political conditions. By presenting alternative sociopolitical visions (democracy, Islamism, freedom, pluralism), contenders challenged the incumbent regimes' monopoly over the ideological sphere, whilst attempting to engage and mobilise the latent public. 21 For example, the Midan al-Tahrir Square collective action was a site of political protest that challenged Mubarak's monopoly over the national narrative, whilst seeking to mobilise the public for change; it did so by imagining and promising an alternative society. 22 The uprisings opened an opportunity for change, but whether the opportunity would be realised or not is a different question. What contenders perceive as an opportunity, which is 'an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert populations' 23 , regimes and their supporters perceive as a threat. To delegitimise antagonists, regimes engage in framing processes, accusing the latter of being "terrorists", "agents of foreign states" or "instigators of instability". In heterogeneous societies, such as Iraq or Syria, interactive framings can activate or aggravate identity divides; this occurs when 'political entrepreneurs draw together credible stories from available cultural materials, similarly create we-they boundaries, activate both stories and boundaries as a function of current political circumstances, and manoeuvre to suppress competing models'. 24 Contentious politics also involves collective violent campaigns that defy a regime's capacity to monopolise coercion. When this occurs, it provides the space for contenders to establish new forms of authority: establish order (monopolising coercion in "liberated areas"), institutionalise courts, capture sites of economic significance, raise new flags, and protect the 'boundaries' of the areas they occupy. Regime's and "counterregimes" engage in rival projects of state formation. 25 Contentious politics, however, need not always be about state (re-) formation; I analytically connect state formation to CP because most Arab states remain prone to reconstruction, and contentious politics are integral to this process. The Arab uprisings are an episode of intense struggle between regimes and their contenders; but the quantitative change in intensity of the struggle, its visibility, and the emergence of new actors, claims and forms of political mobilisation should not conceal the qualitative continuity of the struggle from the pre-
But what does the examination of state formation and contentious politics imply for the democratization debate? Contentious politics, which in the Arab world is directly linked to state formation/reformation, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. Necessary because contentious politics reflect periods of intense struggles between regimes and their rivals, juxtaposing opposing socio-political claims, and generating conditions for political change, including democratization. However, as the cases of Syria and Iraq will illustrate, there are several variables that can intervene between contentious politics and democratization. Such variables include, but need not be limited to, sectarian and ethnic fragmentation, the internalization of external geopolitical rivalry, and collective violence, which not only constrain democratization but also threaten to fragment the state as a territorial entity.
Back to the Future: the Arab Uprisings and State (re) formation in Iraq and Syria
State-building and regime erosion in Iraq (1968 Iraq ( -2003 and Syria (1963 Syria ( -2011 The state formation process in Iraq and Syria-the attempt by Arab nationalist regimes to attain political independence, socio-economic development, and nation-buildingsince the 1960s fomented the seeds of regime erosion, returning these states to square one of state formation half-a-century later 26 . Regime erosion can be attributed to three interrelated trajectories that had varying effects on the two cases: (1) intra-regime and regime-opposition struggles for domination led to the monopolisation of power in the hands of a few and to mass political exclusion; (2) to reproduce their domination at the state level, regimes resorted to kinship ties, contributing-intentionally or unintentionally-to the activation and reproduction of identity divides within their societies, divides which political contenders utilised for political mobilisation; and (3) because of political exclusion and the activation of identity divides, regimes and the territorial states in which they dominate became more vulnerable to unanticipated shocks (such as the Arab uprisings) and external penetration, which aggravated regime erosion and state disintegration. and foreign policy decisions. 28 In both cases, political exclusion had adverse effects on state-building; the political system did not offer opportunities for accountability, especially of regime figures whose presence was crucial for regime survival. 29 32 The identity divides separating the Iraqi Arabs from the Kurds started earlier and was aggravated by the failure of successive Iraqi regimes to accept Kurdish cultural and regional autonomy. 33 In the 1990s Iraqi Kurds began to enjoy de facto autonomy before, as we shall see below, this became constitutional in 2005.
In Syria, Assad faced an Islamic rebellion culminating in civil war in 1978-1982. 34 This civil war and the regime's attack on the Sunni bastion of Hama, which killed thousands, in 1982 reinforced sectarian divisions and perceptions within Syria, undermined the regime's secular ideology and gave regime contenders the opportunity to frame it as sectarian and Alawite. To be sure, the presence of heterogeneous society, made up of various sectarian and ethnic communities, as that of Iraq and Syria, does not in itself cause sectarian divisions, nor does it imply that the conflict is purely cultural; but a heterogeneous society provides the cultural material for political contenders to frame the conflict in cultural terms in order to mobilise support. The Islamists targeting of Alawite officers, as in the Aleppo's artillery school 1979, and the discourse employed, which framed the regime in sectarian terms, activated identity divides in this contentious episode. 35 In this case-unlike after 2011-the sectarian cleavage was muted by the fact that the largely Sunni peasantry remained in the regime coalition, coopted by Ba'thist agrarian reforms 36 .
Thirdly, the combination of domestic political exclusion and identity divides exposed Iraq and Syria to external infiltration. The strategic location of both states, in the Arab-Israeli conflict region (Syria) and the heart of the Middle East (Iraq), has meant that domestic rivalries become integral to the regional (and international) balance of power. In the state formation process, the fear of external subversion exacerbated the drive to monopolise power domestically. 37 Regimes and their contenders perceived regional developments as opportunities or threats to alter and maintain the domestic power balance. For example, the Syrian civil war in 1978-1982 cannot be divorced from Egypt's pressure on Assad after ties between the two states soured in the wake of the Camp David agreements. The Islamists perceived this as an opportunity to topple Assad; but it also increased the regime drive to maintain power. 38 Similarly, the 1991 uprising in the southern provinces of Iraq came with the perception of (and promise made by the US to) the Shi'as of Iraq that Hussein's regime would be toppled. However, during that uprising, Hussein capitalised on the regional and international decision to keep him in power to crush the uprising. Saddam Hussein framed the uprisings as an Iranian conspiracy aiming to transform Iraq into an Islamic state. The repression of the uprising, however, ingrained sectarian and ethnic boundaries in the country. 39 The Arab Uprisings and state formation in Iraq and Syria, 2011 Syria, -2014 It is in the context of the state formation trajectories examined above that we can understand the impact of the uprisings on Iraq and Syria. In the eyes of the Syrian and Iraqi opposition groups, the 'Arab Spring' presented an opportunity to readdress the State' on a wide swath of territories ranging from the east of Aleppo in Syria to the Sunni-majority regions, including Anbar, Ninenevah, and Mosul in Iraq. 48 . The quick collapse of the Iraqi army in these Sunni areas exposed its weak legitimacy. 49 Indicative of the sectarian framing encouraged by rival regional powers, when Mosul fell to ISIS, Saudi Arabia considered it to be a 'revolution' by Sunnis who were frustrated by Maliki's rule. 50 The occupation of most of the Sunni areas by the Islamic State led Mazuud Barazani to exploit the Iraqi army's weakness to occupy the oil-rich and contested territory of Kirkuk. Barazani then announced that the Iraqi political process had failed and conditions for Kurdish statehood had emerged. 51 By August of 2014, the statebuilding process in Iraq and the impact of the Arab uprisings did not only besiege democratic consolidation, as will be argued in the conclusion, but also threatened the disintegration of Iraq as a state. . Within a few weeks, the realm of politics, which was concentrated in a few hands, and which contained and repressed any attempts to promote alternative political visions, opened widely for numerous political actors that rose to challenge Assad's rule.
In this contentious episode, we observe both a continuation of and innovation in regimesociety contention.
Initially, Syrian protestors consciously avoided any sectarian or ethnic slogans that might alienate Syria's minorities and that the regime could use to delegitimise the opposition. The peaceful protesters called for 'reform' and advanced a democratic and pluralistic vision, thus challenging Assad's monopoly over the national narrative. 52 But the regime's strategy to prevent any Midan al-Tahrir-like contentious performance led it to overreact violently. Beyond the use of violence, Assad, relying on the support of state employees, some segments of the urban middle classes, his own Alawi base, and the Syrian crony capitalists that had benefited from privatisation schemes, 53 staged counter political rallies in most of Syria's cities; he called for a national dialogue; and drafted and then held a referendum on a new constitution, ending the Baath's 'legal' monopoly over the political system. 54 Whilst these regime adaptations could have contributed to political reform, they, however, failed to attract support from the Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Council (SNC), most of which was in exile and expected a swift fall of the regime. 55 Assad's survival, however, and the absence of a political agreement on transition gave rise to an armed struggle, transforming Syria into a collapsed state marred by a civil war. In a span of two years (2011-2013) Syria turned from an influential regional actor into a battlefield for geopolitical rivalries. In the eyes of the opposition, political protest, on its own, had revealed its limits 56 Despite the varying origins of the rebellion-from the rise of Salafism in Dera, to opposition against religious restrictions in Banyas, to a revolt against the Alawi shabbiha in Latakia-it was concentrated in the periphery, where state services and control has weakened, before moving to Sunni hotbeds in Hama and Deir el-Zur. 57 Assad's military strategy aimed to concentrate efforts on the main cities in order to preserve the strategic link between Damascus-Homs-Latakia, but this came at the expense of leaving peripheral areas to the control of rebel groups.
With state weakening and regime loss of territory to the opposition, initially to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) of military defectors, Islamist jihadist groups began to see an opportunity to establish a foothold in Syria. 58 The rise of jihadist groups, such as East role under the Obama administration 61 . For Iran, Hizbullah, and, as mentioned above, the Iraqi regime, a fall of Assad would be a strategic loss and a threat to Shi'a influence in the region. Lebanon's Hizbullah feared that Assad's fall would diminish the movement's strategic depth in its conflict with Israel. 62 The rivalries of these geopolitical camps began to directly affect the civil war in Syria. Each camp began to channel money, arms, and men to its domestic allies in Syria.
On the one hand, these external infiltrations contributed to the further erosion of the By the end of 2013, the Syrian war had caused more than 100,000 deaths, two million refugees, 63 and the disintegration of the country. In June 2014, more than half a century after the Baath Party found roots in Syria and Iraq, a new ideological movement represented in ISIS announced its "Caliphate", straddling the Sykes-Picot political boundaries, and dominated over most of eastern Syrian and western Iraq. 64
Conclusion: Prospects and Obstacles to Democratisation in Iraq and Syria
The Arab uprisings was an episode of contentious politics that challenged the existing political order in Iraq and Syria and formed an opportunity to renegotiate the basis of political rule in each of the two cases. However, due to the coercive state-building process in Iraq and Syria, their heterogeneous social composition, and geo-political locations, the Arab uprisings led to state disintegration in both countries. Whilst the challenge to the state boundaries represented by ISIS may not endure, largely due to the socio-political resistance this movement faces in Arab societies and to the resistance of the international and regional systems to a revision of state boundaries, both countries face long term challenges to consolidate (Iraq) or reconstruct (Syria) Whilst state formation and crystallisation long preceded democratisation in Europe, in countries like Iraq and Syria, and for that matter Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, these two processes are converging. Iraq and Syria are finding that to reconstruct (and avoid the collapse of) their states they will need to open the political arena to various communal and political actors, triggering a process of democratisation. Successful state formation will mean democratisation. But this process is, and will be, burdened by major challenges, not least the geopolitical rivalries; by political Islam, especially extremist versions, such as ISIS, that challenge democracy as a political system; by transnational sectarianism that is inflaming divided societies; and by the sectarian/ethnic apportionment that enervate institutions, decrease accountability, and facilitate corruption in consociational versions of democracy.
